

Approved For Release 2013/01/27 : CIA-RDP80-01975A004800040001-4

TOP SECRET

25X1

4800040001-4

DOCUMENT NO. 4

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 4

☐ DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS, S, C

NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010

AUTH: NR 70-2

DATE: 5 JUN 1980

REVIEWER: ☐

5 November 1959

Copy No. C 65

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



State Dept. review completed

Approved For Release 2013/01/27 : CIA-RDP80-01975A004800040001-4

TOP SECRET

4800040001-4

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800040001-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800040001-4

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5 November 1959

25X1

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR-Greece: (The Soviet Embassy in Athens made an indirect approach to the Greek Government for an invitation for Khrushchev to stop over in Athens before his visit with De Gaulle, according to Foreign Minister Averoff, who said the proposed visit was rejected as "not opportune." A Greek newspaperman was used to make the approach, presumably to avoid the risk of a formal refusal, but probably also to ensure publicity. Averoff on 3 November also stated that the Soviet ambassador has repeatedly urged that Averoff and Prime Minister Karamanlis visit Moscow, using the line that now that Khrushchev and President Eisenhower are exchanging visits, "What are you Greeks afraid of?"

25X1

25X1

(Page 1)

25X1

Bloc-Ethiopia: In a survey of recent Ethiopian-bloc developments, Ambassador Bliss in Addis Ababa concludes that the bloc is moving rapidly to exploit the Emperor's visit to Moscow in July. The ambassador foresees an intensified Soviet cultural exchange offensive and an expanded information program.

25X1

25X1

Communist China - Indonesia: (Communist China is exerting more pressure on Djakarta to modify its discriminatory measures against Chinese businessmen. Peiping reportedly has refused to exchange ratification instruments for the dual nationality treaty negotiated four years ago. The Indonesian Government has expressed its intent to carry out, with some qualifications, its decreed restrictions on Chinese, and the Army has taken steps to this end in several areas.)

25X1

25X1

25X1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1

Watch Committee Conclusions: Situations susceptible of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet bloc action which would jeopardize US interests exist in Laos and in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq.

25X1

NO
Laos: Dissident military activity has remained at a low level, but subversive activity continues at a high level. The dissidents continue to have the objective of establishing themselves in a strong position which they could use as the basis for political bargaining or for the expansion of military operations. Direct North Vietnamese military intervention is not likely in the immediate future.

Middle East: The situation in Iraq remains unstable, and the possibility of further assassination attempts or coups remains. In these circumstances, the UAR may become more deeply involved.

25X1

5 Nov 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

25X1

III. THE WEST

OK France-USSR: The French Communist party's official admission that its previous denunciation of De Gaulle's proposals for self-determination in Algeria was in error follows Khrushchev's cautious endorsement in his 31 October speech. These developments appear responsive to Paris' insistence, as a condition for French participation in a summit conference, that the USSR first demonstrate on a world-wide basis its desire for a genuine detente. Several French leaders have recently specified Algeria as the issue on which France expects concrete evidence of Soviet sincerity. [REDACTED]

25X1

LATE ITEM

25X6

5 Nov 59

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR Continues Effort to Push Detente With Greece

Moscow is continuing to urge Greece, apparently regarded by Soviet leaders as a "soft spot" in the Western defense system, to take advantage of the current international "thaw" to improve relations with the USSR and other bloc countries. The Soviet Embassy in Athens has recently sought an invitation from the Greek Government for Premier Khrushchev to stop over for talks in Athens on his way to visit De Gaulle, according to Foreign Minister Averoff, who said that the proposed visit was rejected as "not opportune." A Greek newspaperman was used to make the approach, presumably to avoid the risk of a direct refusal but probably also to ensure publicity and provide an issue on which the left can criticize the government for failing to improve relations with Moscow.

Averoff stated on 3 November that he had also rejected a proposal by Soviet Ambassador Sergeyev that Averoff and Prime Minister Karamanlis visit Moscow. The Soviet official asked what "you Greeks are afraid of," now that Khrushchev and President Eisenhower are exchanging visits. Sergeyev has also used this line in requesting favorable Greek action on Soviet requests to increase cultural exchanges and to reroute Moscow's air service to Cairo through Athens instead of through Albania.

In recent months Rumania and Bulgaria have attempted to stimulate opposition in Greece to any strengthening of Greece's defense ties with the West, such as missile sites on Greek territory. Rumanian Deputy Premier Joja--the highest ranking Rumanian to visit Greece for several years--is talking with Averoff and other officials, presumably to take a new sounding of Athens' attitude toward bloc schemes for closer Balkan collaboration. Recent developments suggest that bloc leaders are planning to renew their bid for a conference of Balkan-Adriatic countries to consider an atom-free zone in the area.)

25X1

25X1

25X1

Soviet Bloc Scoring Gains in Ethiopia

In a survey of recent Soviet bloc activities in Ethiopia, Ambassador Bliss in Addis Ababa concludes that the bloc is moving to exploit the Soviet "breakthrough" scored by agreements signed during the Emperor's visit to Moscow in July. The initial group of Soviet specialists, due to arrive shortly in Ethiopia to conduct economic studies related to the USSR's \$100,000,000 aid agreement, will be followed by more or less permanent personnel. A 20-man Czech economic mission is expected by the end of the year to discuss utilization of the \$20,000,000 credit which the Emperor subsequently negotiated in Prague.

The ambassador foresees an intensified Soviet cultural exchange offensive and an expanded information program--possibly including a cultural center--as a result of the Soviet-Ethiopian agreement in July to expand cultural contacts. He reports that Moscow appears to have attracted appreciable support from "fellow travelers and neutralists."

Poland, seeking to exploit Ethiopia's increased receptivity to bloc overtures, is exerting considerable pressure to expand trade in the Horn of Africa. Warsaw plans to establish a legation in Addis Ababa by January. Bulgaria recently opened a legation in Ethiopia, and the first Ethiopian students to accept bloc scholarships are to receive technical training in Czechoslovakia. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800040001-4

Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004800040001-4

III. THE WEST

French Communist Shift on Algeria Aligns Party With Recent Moscow Line

The admission by the French Communist party (PCF) central committee on 4 November that it had been in error in denouncing French President de Gaulle's 16 September proposals for self-determination in Algeria echoes Soviet Premier Khrushchev's cautious endorsement of the program before the Supreme Soviet on 31 October. Although the PCF shift was facilitated by the liberal turn De Gaulle has given Algerian policy, the timing of these developments suggests that the USSR wishes to appear responsive to the French cabinet communiqué of 16 October. This document, reportedly drafted personally by De Gaulle, called for evidence of relaxation of tension around the world as the major precondition for French participation in any East-West summit talks.

The French view that the Algerian issue provides an immediate test for the professed Soviet desire for a relaxation of tensions was publicly pointed up last week end in speeches by two leaders close to De Gaulle--French National Assembly President Jacques Chaban-Delmas and President of the Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee Maurice Schumann. Most Frenchmen appear convinced that their difficulties in Algeria would diminish considerably if the USSR were to cease its support of Arab-sponsored anti-French resolutions in the UN and its indirect backing of the rebels in the form of arms shipments from the satellites and material aid to the refugees. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Intelligence Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP75A004800040001-4

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP75A004800040001-4

TOP SECRET